Article

The Strategic Duality and Convergence of China's Transition in the Global Climate Regime: From a Veto to a Leading Country

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Abstract

Since the mid-2010s, China has gradually but explicitly altered its position in the process of global climate negotiations, from a vetoing to a leading nation. Experts in the International Relations field have commented that the main reason is China's aspiration to become a global power, using the "environment" as one of the effective means to consolidate the nation's soft power and reinforce multilateral diplomacy. However, a political interpretation (seizing the opportunity to secure hegemonic power in the process of regime strengthening) does not adequately explain the complexity behind China's changing role in this transitory period. In this regard, a question arises: "Why and how has China undergone such an evolution, particularly in the arena of climate regime?" I suggest broadly five factors along with detailed discussions. The main factors include both external (e.g. regime interplay between climate and development aid, Sino-U.S. relations, global green technology market) and internal (China's ecological modernization). The paper argues that all those factors interacted with one another in a relatively effective way during the current transitory period of China moving toward an environmentally sustainable society. While each of the above-mentioned factors is driven by different and multi-layered forces behind them, the commonly applicable driver cutting across all factors is "the state's strategic use of transitory duality." The paper concludes with a brief discussion on the implications of China's increasing role in global ecological development.

Keywords

China's changing status, global climate change regime, ecological development

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INTRODUCTION

This article is to provide a commentary, rather than full-length research, on China's changing attitudes in its interaction with global environmental governance. It primarily addresses the question of how China altered her position "from a vetoing to a leading nation" in the field of global climate regimes. It provides an analysis on "the state's strategic use of transitory duality" that led the country to leap toward transformation with a relatively successful convergence. In doing so, this article attempts to answer the question: "Why did China change its attitude, becoming more cooperative in the process of environmental regime strengthening since 2009/2010 especially in the climate change-related field?"

Liberal institutionalists including regime theorists note that, in general, a change in a state's attitude can occur under the following circumstances: when its own understanding of the problem changes due to new scientific evidence; because its economic interests have changed; due to a change of government; under effective domestic political pressure to change its policy; for fear of negative reactions from other governments or advanced international opinion (Chasek *et al* 2017; Zhu *et al* 2016). These factors are to some degree applicable to China's case also although a more detailed analyses, specifically on China "and" on climate change regime need adding. The term, "regime" is used, employing Max Weber, Shapiro, for example, to explain the "[p]rocess, policies, laws, and institutions that shape social relations and guide public attitudes and behavior" (Shapiro 2014: 19). It can be understood as a kind of loose global entity that has shaped member countries and citizens' attitudes and their relationships, structured by a set of norms, principles, laws (binding or non-binding), and regulations, and participated in by state actors and non-state actors alike.

Over the last two decades or so since 1997 when the Kyoto Protocol was first adopted, all the subsequent meetings of the Conference of Parties (COP) afterwards suffered a great deal from fierce conflicts of interests among the participating countries. Accordingly, the evolution of the global climate change regime ever since has witnessed a sharp division between so-called historical emitters (western advanced economies), and emerging emitters that had been represented by China with strong support by other major developing countries, notably, India and Brazil.

Nevertheless, since the 2014 meeting (COP20), China has been its attitude, changing diplomatic stance from an outspoken veto to, allegedly a lead nation. Finally in 2015 at the Paris COP21, China became explicitly cooperative, and insinuated that the country will be a responsible partner in resolving global issues especially climate change that has become

one of the top agenda items under the Xi Jinping government of China.

Many commentators and analysts of International Relations or radical ecologists tend to view such a trend as an empty diplomatic gesture or a purely political strategy to gain hegemonic power in the global negotiation process. According to those views, China's gesture hardly attracts positive reactions, being understood merely as an insufficient, over-ambitious and ineffective claim. Discussing all the barriers to enhancing environmental performance is undoubtedly very important, thus a great deal of research has already dealt with direct relevant or related issues. This paper, to the contrary, attempts to shed light upon the other side of China's gaining in confidence in this field which has been relatively under-researched, at least among environmentalists with social science backgrounds. It is true that China has become the largest contributors to the global "total volume" of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Many have commented that it has no visible achievements in environmental improvements so far, thus most are very critical and skeptical of what China's government has done in this field. Adding to this, looking into the grounds of China's seemingly abrupt turning of its diplomatic position is equally meaningful in order to understand whether such a changing attitude can be grounded in incremental evolution of society as a whole, somehow moving towards some degree of "ecological re-modernization" as much as the current Xi government aspires.

My initial answer to the inquiry at this stage is: While the Chinese government has been equipped with sufficient capability to play a greater role in the global climate regime, the state's move, is still, implementation-wise, ecologically limited and unpredictable, and might also take an unjust way in implementation in due course.

EXPLORING MAIN DRIVERS

In the following sections, broadly, five factors are presented. They are closely interlinked and help understanding the main forces and drivers behind China's transition which motivated the country to alter its status with ambitious reduction targets and pledges for positive engagements in the coming decades. In addition, implications are discussed in view of re-positioning China in the global climate negotiation process.

Effectiveness of International Pressure

China has, *a priori,* ignored external pressures but in fact as early as in the late 1990s with the emergence of the Kyoto climate framework, and heading to accession to the WTO system a few years ahead, international and regional pressures on the Chinese government to address air pollution issues paved the way for China to play a significant role by engaging in the global negotiation process (Zhu *et al* 2016). According to existing ecological modernization theories (e.g. Barrett ed. 2005), international pressure and vigorous interactions ("policy diffusion") occur in the relatively later stages of the process of ecological evolution. Contrarily, in the case of China, external pressures were the most significant initiating force that constantly pushed the government into acting on and quickly absorbing international environmental standards. Although China, as a non-Annex I country, was exempted from the obligation of concrete GHG emission reduction target, external pressures were not ignorable. Regional climate-related institutions mushroomed mainly dealing with China's trans-boundary pollutants, such as acid rain caused by SOx and yellow dust etc. In East Asia, the Trilateral Environmental Ministerial Meeting (1st TEMM in 1999) was one of those institutions concerning trans-boundary pollution issues among China, Japan and South Korea. Japan, as the only leading country in East Asia in designing the Kyoto Protocol, had a particular sense of responsibility for making the protocol function (Kolmass 2017: 469-470). Moreover, it was Japan's ambition to increase her role in East Asia, still hoping at that time to constrain China's rise regionally with softer measures through increasing her influence on regional and global environmental affairs. While not directly using the term, "trans-boundary" air pollution, which China was usually reluctant to recognize, governments and regional institutions not only pushed China but at the same time actively cooperated by providing funds, green investments and transferring environment-related technical assistance, under the label of "green" projects. The period witnessed a sudden and massive explosion of those projects especially in such areas as reforestation, eco-city building, waste management, and an extensive range of climate mitigation/adaptation technologies. China could easily absorb climate-related technologies, information, and policy tools from outside world which was keen to transfer various aid in return for the government's further facilitating trade relationships.

Since the early 2000s, China's economic growth began to be coupled with carbon emission levels, and by 2006 China became the world's largest GHG emitter, surpassing U.S. emission levels (in terms of its total volume not per capita). This has fundamentally

diluted the significance of the Kyoto Protocol, which is divided between Annex I and non-Annex I, as China belonged to the latter group. The world began to realize that without engaging China in climate negotiations, it was unfeasible to strengthen the regime through which countries negotiate their emissions targets in concrete terms. The international community's pressure on China became harsher: for example. the U.S.'s push on China with a carbon tariff starting from 2007 and the European Union's (EU) establishment of the Emission Trading System zone in 2005, by the time the Kyoto Protocol entered into force. The Chinese government also realized the necessity of participating in the fast evolving climate diplomacy that may directly affect other aspects of development, particularly concerning international trade relations.

During this period, on one hand, China kept struggling with dealing with those powerful lead nations' pressure on it; but on the other, China secured enormous benefits out of preserving the country's position as a recipient and simultaneously as a non-Annex I country (one aspect of the "state's strategic use of transitory duality"). Meanwhile, China kept her influence over major developing nations, representing the rest of developing world of the G77. Criticism on China's environmental performance peaked in 2011 at the Durban Platform. Annex I countries led by Australia, Canada and the EU harshly blamed the major vetoing countries. Member countries managed to agree upon a slight re-interpretation of the principle of the "Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR)," adding the term, "responsibilities for all." According to UNFCCC (UN Framework Convention on Climate Change) principle, parties should act to protect the climate system "on the basis of equality and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities."

This resulted in the convergence (confluence) between China for development and climate regimes (regime interplay). The international aid community allocated increasing amount of green Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget in various kinds of environmental projects in China, especially, led by major bilateral donors such as Japan and Germany.

Yet, an important factor to consider is that not all developing countries have demonstrated the same capacity as China on the question of how to utilise and control external forces (influx of foreign investments, funds, and technical assistance). In this regard, the next element to explore is about China's capacity building in an interactive and reciprocal manner between partner countries.

China's Capacity Building and Infusion of Policies

Usually "capacity building" has been regarded as the most difficult part when donors have to deal with developing countries under partnership. One recent study on China's Emission Trading Scheme describes the Chinese government's way to interact with global environmental regimes. The study explores how effectively China has been adopting international environmental policy tools/standards, which is described as "policy infusion." Policy infusion is defined as "the mirror-inverted process of policy diffusion - namely, a process through which a mixture of external experiences is infused into the domestic policy process of one specific jurisdiction" (Biedenkopf *et al.* 2017). The authors use the case of recent implementation of the Emission Trading System (ETS) which, ironically, has been criticized by leftists as a typical incarnation of marketizing and politicizing carbon dioxide, a mean of conspiracy among industrialized countries; and this is a policy that is crafted by neo-liberal capitalist countries in which developing countries would never be part of the system because of its highly complicated policy design and institutional and operational complexity. An ETS typically requires high level of intensive pre-research, institutional coordination, policy adjustments, a wide range of collaboration across different government bodies, and voluntary support from private sectors including industries, investors, and financial institutions. China launched seven pilot GHG ETSs in 2010 being implemented in five cities including Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing and Shenzhen together with two provinces, Guangdong and Hubei.

Thanks mainly to centralized policy-making (while implementation is highly de-centralized), China quickly set up all those requirements and conditions for the ETS, entering the exclusive club of the ETS zone last year. Among scholars of environmental politics, it is a common view that a fully participatory democracy would, in theory, provide better conditions for a country to achieve higher level of environmental performance (e.g. Carter & Mol eds. 2013). It usually argues that there is a higher possibility that a more democratic approach to climate change policy could have produced optimal consequences (e.g. Gilley 2012). There might be numerous barriers in implementations but further scrutiny is required whether or not a political system would be the most critical determinant of a country's environmental performance. In the case of the China's ETS, a particular gatekeeping role was assumed by the NDRC (the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission) which has played a key role in steering the capacity-building efforts of external financiers, but also the Chinese consultancy SinoCarbon and Tsinghua University

were key brokering actors as the above cited article by Biedenkopf, Eynde, and Walker (2017) explains. It also manifests that how China effectively utilised her dual status both as a recipient and an influential emerging donor for other developing nations (another aspect of "the state's strategic use of transitory duality"). Only for China's ETS implementation, there had been over 20 donors (multilateral and bilateral) have been engaged although those green donors have their own interests to pursue. This explains that donors are highly fragmented but the recipient was highly coordinated.

Societal Level of Ecological Evolution

With all these interaction with the outside world, internal change is also an important driver whether we can call it as indigenous rise of environmentalism (e.g. Morton 2008; Stalley & Yang 2006; Zhu et al. 2016). Environmentalism in general evolves in parallel with government's recognition of environmental constraints/externalities: thus, being followed by efforts of re-modernization with mainstreaming or internalizing environmental constraints into the development and growth path. Most importantly, high level air pollution itself obviously decreases the overall quality of citizen's life which may nurture people's discontent against the central and local governments and contributes to destabilizing society. There has been numerous research on the rise of environmentalism in China conducted by political sociologists (e.g. Economy 2010; Shapiro 2014) increasing number of occasions where citizen's complaints on pollution-related issues are exposed. Cases are varied covering water contamination, local governments' negligence on regulating industrial pollutions, pesticides misuse/overuse, trading toxic wastes and stored in poor areas in China, ignoring regulations of Environmental Impact Assessment procedure, bribing local governments to loosening monitoring process, misuse of environment-related tax and subsidies. All these have raised the question of environmental justice at domestic level. Several media sources have reported that since mid-2000s there have been over 1,000 per week unreported environmental movements across the nation at various scales although environmental NGOs are still rather weak thus organized actions are limited (e.g. Stalley & Yang 2006). Numerous works have addressed the question of environmental refugees, forced relocation due to the huge engineering projects such as hydro dams or canal constructions. Middle class people or richer farmers leave the country, buying agricultural lands elsewhere in South America, Australia and Europe, mainly because of pollution and soil and air quality (a group of luxurious escapers as opposed to forced/involuntary migration due to loss of

livelihood that is directly affected by habitat loss). The trans-boundary water pollution issue has caused citizens' discontent, resulting in unwanted re-location. Transferring water from Yangzi to the Yellow River or canal project would have caused 300,000 residents' forcible relocation (Shapiro 2014: 48-49). All these domestic pressures became important elements that led government responds to the extent possible. A number of experts and commentators still criticize harshly the government's action as either insufficient or recently too ambitious considering China's current capacity. The government sent a strong signal to selected industries and local governments by imposing stricter rules on emission level. From the early 2000s, with the 2009 after the Beijing Olympic, stimulus package and the last five-year plan (2016-2020) to the 2017 Chinese Communist Party's 19th Party Congress, the issue of environmental and resource protection has gained momentum as a top priority of political agenda.

Recently, coal-dependency in conjunction with Beijing's endeavors to curb air pollution is a top legislative priority in China. This can be interpreted as China reaching the stage of "recognition and acceptance of the pollution problems, being shifted from the stage of 'denial'" if applying Barrett's model framing a state's evolution of ecological modernization.

Usually in a liberal society, a bottom-up process of societal-level environmentalism develops first but in China top-down awareness and recognition of such problems came first to make things happen, taking concrete actions, and finally moving toward building to a degree, a greener state.

Development of Green Industry

The limited but rising environmental awareness and internal pressure interact with the next factor which is presented as the fourth driver in this paper: China's rapid development in the green industry sector, as a ground for China to be confident about her ambitious reduction goal. By 2030, the government announced a series of plans that carbon emissions per unit of GDP will have been cut by 60-65% relative to 2005 levels; the share of non-fossil fuels in energy consumption will be about 20% (from 17%). Meeting those commitments may mean slower growth, economic restructuring and rebalancing (active incorporation of ecological constraints into the economic system and growth pattern). There are more concerns than optimism at the moment. By dint of the rapid growth in renewable energy sector, renewable energy use grew by 21% in 2015 reaching around 17% of the worldwide total, but China's share of renewables remains lower considering its share of

world energy consumption, which is nearly 23% (BP 2016) (17%: 23%). Within "less than ten years China built the world's largest wind power capacity, and continues to expand it. China is also nearly tripling its hydropower capacity; it now dominates the world market in PV (photovoltaic) cell production and has just become the world's largest generator of solar power in early 2017. China's National Energy Administration (CNEA) announced the investment of another $361 billion into renewable power generation by 2020 (Nielsen & Ho 2017). Reflecting this, one significant indicator is the number of China's green technology-related patent applications that has reached the highest in the world. This reminds us of Porter's hypothesis informing that, to some extent, China proves that adopting stricter regulations stimulates the country's enterprises to be more active in green innovation, then in turn, enhancing competitiveness of domestic firms in the international market, leading to increasing volume of trade after all (Wagner 2004; Zeng & Eastin 2011). However, the problem is that, even if China's case positively proves and confirms Porter's hypothesis, it is still not to say that actual environmental improvement in terms of performance has been achieved.

In a pluralism-based democratic society where environmental governance is well-functioning, it would take much longer time to get the green message across to all stakeholders (especially the private sector) and such a "process" itself is highly protected and appreciated. China's case may demonstrate another model of effective policy outcomes when the government timely determines how far stricter environmental regulatory policy should be pushed forward. An outcome and result-based approach explains the Chinese case better. For Beijing, "sharing information for collaboration and transparent procedures" have little value in itself (the debates over deliberative or participatory democracies for environmental decision making). Given that there are over 100,000 environmental and climate-related international organizations (counting only with "public" feature), totalitarian/authoritarian "centralized" way of decision-making has so far been functional in China.

Chinese Way of Multilateralism and Rising Role in Climate Diplomacy

One last "triggering" factor for China's changing role in the global climate regime is its diplomatic interests beyond the issue of climate change *per se*, such as the needs of promoting multilateralism. The state agenda of reshaping the world with Chinese

multilateralism has been accidentally reinforced as a "chance" (for the time being) that it seized recently, being a result of the U.S.'s changing views, taking a vetoing nation's role in this global scene. In March 2014, Premier Li Keqang declared a "war against pollution." A program to reduce emissions from the top 10,000 largest carbon dioxide emitters was included in the 12th Five Year Plan; and 2014 onwards, global leadership pledges at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting: "U.S.-China Agreement" (ratified in 2016 at G20) led to the 2015 (COP21) adoption of the Paris Accord (with the agreement to submission of the intended nationally determined contributions) (Schreurs 2016). In 2014, climate was the only agenda to which both China and the U.S., during the Barack Obama administration agreed upon on the road to the 2014 APEC concerning curbing GHG emission. Around that time, the U.S. and China clashed over their own way of reinforcing multilateralism in the view of reshaping the trade order in the Asia Pacific. Since the Paris COP21 meeting, China explicitly showed the world, by turning her position from influential vetoing to a leading nation, reconfirmed at every significant global event ever since, including the G20 meetings. Besides, the ratification of the bilateral agreement at the G20 Hangzhou Summit in September 2016 with the U.S. was an important milestone, as China accounts for 27% of global carbon emissions and the US 16% (as of 2015, according to BP 2016). The 13th Five Year Plan issued in early 2016 includes measures intended to help China implement its 2030 climate, energy efficiency, and fuel switching targets (Wang *et al.* 2011).

IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA'S EMERGING ROLE IN STRENGTHENING GLOBAL CLIMATE REGIME

There could be a number of critical implications of China's changing stance in the global climate regime depending on various academic disciplines and approaches. Within the scope of this paper, this part discusses "ecological concerns" on China's changing role in this field. Many scenarios and concerns could arise.

Some concerns are rising, especially from an ecological point of view firstly, celebrating well-designed policy options on paper (policy outcome) that are not always linked with actual environmental performance. A desirable environmental performance aligned with policy goals may take a much longer time to be fulfilled in China due to its vast territorial scale and administrative complexity. It is quite hard to expect to have immediate effects like in smaller political entities such as Singapore or Taiwan that are often taken by Chinese

policy makers as good environmental performing neighbors to benchmark. Moreover, the procedural mechanism in China can be described as centralized decision-making with a highly de-centralized implementation system. Nonetheless, China is better equipped with sufficient capacity to speed up implementation once the central government has a strong determination, reason and interest to push forward its environment-related agenda. The Chinese government, however, could control strategically the pace of implementing harsher regulations on pollution due to the fact that the country still needs some room, for the time being, to keep the economy growing. This signifies that letting highly polluting but economically viable industries breathe (pollute) while maintaining their competitiveness in the global market. The main focus was on China's own struggle for re-positioning the nation in global climate negotiations, but many barriers remain unsolved. The negative consequences are already reported such as natural gas shortages after ordering northern cities to end reliance on heating from coal; particularly in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region for "extreme conditions with (the) gas peak forecast." Despite all previous efforts, air pollution worsened in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region in the first nine months as concentrations of fine smog-forming particles known as PM2.5 rose about 10% from a year before (the Ministry of Environmental Protection). In Beijing, levels of larger PM10 particles soared 53.8% in September (Stanway 2017).

My second point regards the political and environmental implications at a global level. As in Japan and South Korea during the post-industrial era, policy and regulations concerning pollution are highly developed, with governments' backing of green technology and green R&D leading to green industries flourishing. And yet, emission levels and use of natural resources including conventional oil and gas have not decreased. It also proves that, in fact raising energy efficiency does not necessarily lead a society to more sustainable economic growth. Rather, a long list of policy outcome is often used as a green shield to shun effectively internal and external criticism. If one compares only the lists of environmental policy framework, legislation and laws, most industrialized countries may appear to be the greenest states on the globe. This is one of the critical reasons for state policy concentrated-research may allude to an erroneous or insufficient analysis on categorizing "green" countries. Without a fundamental societal level of indigenous environmentalism, neoliberalism-driven democratic green states may act even more environmentally unsustainable. Likewise, as China's role in the developing world increases, and China's environmental laws became tighter and stricter; unfortunately China's ecological performance outside Chinese territory may manifest greater disparities. Likewise, within China, this may result in "cleaning major cities; pollute outskirts."

In order to meet the reduction target by 2020, tightening domestic regulations are insufficient thus, scholars such as Reilly (2011) raised concerns predicting that implications of China's confidence of meeting the target would mean: increased mining in developing countries, more natural resources extraction from poorer countries; raising nuclear power capacity with global expansion; increasing hydro-dam construction with infrastructure projects both inside and outside China, that causes inequitable water use.

In the pattern of China's ecological (re)modernization, inequitable multi-level disparities are envisaged. The rise of environmentalism is usually led by middle class people who are distinguishable from the group of citizens who are politicized in the context of old politics (Lam 1999) in which mobilized groups of people fight for material improvements. Instead, the politics built by new social movements are generated by public minded advocators of new social values beyond ideological pledges.

Adding to Reilly's insights, another rising concern would be the possibility of Beijing's strategic use of environmental grounds for protecting national enterprises by bringing the issues into the domains of international trade and inconsistent control over domestic industries. There are rising concerns that climate mitigation may be used as a means to justify Beijing's way of governing domestic industries, to control foreign firms in the domestic market, and to control importing firms.

Carbon taxing and the ETS within the Chinese market can also be a governing tool to control selectively and effectively private enterprises. One common negative scenario would be the situation where polluting industries will not bear government's pressures and emission reduction costs (as market measures are not internalized in a stable manner based on mutual consensus or agreements), thus, choose to relocate factories to the countryside or outside China in poorer countries, mostly poorer areas where regulations are also looser.

A structural risk is that local governments' competition becomes harsh in order to achieve an impressive outcome in economic growth. Central government's direct or indirect push of moving polluting industries into the rural areas will neither be controllable nor unwelcomed by local governments. In order to solve the question of equitable distribution of environmental benefits and harm, environmental restrictions need to be imposed across the country evenly and simultaneously. "Greening major cities" in a large country like China would mean polluting poorer regions and poorer countries, by loosening regulations, overlooking regulations, and incoherently following international norms. By using internationally recognized "ethical" justifications (e.g. Supply Chain Emission Control), experts raised some concerns that China may control/influence exports of natural resources, notably from a country like Australia.

Finally, theoretical implications can be drawn. Optimistic regime theories are to some extent convincing if one emphasizes the positive functional influence of the global regimes on China's decision-making process. Within this theoretical framework, the interaction between China and the global climate regime could be used as a successful outcome, engaging China into the process of internationalized environmentalism. Together with regime theories and neoliberalism to some extent help understanding China's changing role in the global climate negotiations. International pressure and interactions between the global climate regime and China through capacity building shaped the current direction of China's climate policy and affected ultimately changing China's role. At the same time, more importantly, China's awareness and readiness to engage in the emerging global green market also played a key role. In addition, according to neo-functionalist regime theory, there could be certain level of spillover effects between regimes or spillovers to other member countries (by persuading unpredictable swing countries or powerful vetoing countries such as India and Brazil). In the global aid governance, China played a role generating a new modality of aid partnership, such as the "South-South partnership," "triangular partnership and so on (e.g. Cabestan 2012). In this sense, China has gradually begun reshaping the world order in this arena of foreign policy, creating a Chinese way in the international aid community. Nonetheless, non-participatory government-imposed top-down environmental policy options (without full-fledged societal level ecologism) may generate wider disparities and more contradictions, adding to unpredictability in the course of implementing policy options for the set mitigation targets.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

China has entered perhaps a new era of greening by dint of external and internal pressures, and by continuous interactions with the global climate regime. Although China is still harshly criticized for the country's gap between adopted policies and actual environmental performance, China has been, to a greater extent, well prepared through policy infusion and effective leap-frogging in the international market and society. However, it is not too clear yet whether, as neo-functionalism informs, there will be positive spillovers to other environmental regimes or influence on other vetoing or swing countries in near future. While China has gradually been recognized as a leading country, the remaining question would be how China will use such internationally legitimized environmental policy tools in conjunction with trade or security measures, while seeking exclusively nationalized interests.

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