
**SINO-CENTRAL ASIAN RELATIONS AND SINO-US RIVALRY
IN THE REGION: A STUDY**

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ABSTRACT

The foreign policy of a country is mostly determined by its geography. The geography compels sovereign states to cultivate relations with their neighboring countries to attain some predetermined interests. Similarly, China has created and maintained quite friendly relations with almost all Central Asian states to fulfill its ever-increasing energy needs and contain the escalating security threat being posed by the assorted terrorist, extremist, militant and separatist groups in the region. Since China is projected to overtake the US in terms of exporting energy resources by 2030, the communist state is striving hard to foster all sorts of ties with the energy-rich the Central Asian states. However, the growing Chinese closeness and affinity with the region have made the US apprehensive of the potential and ominous rise of China which could well dwarf and outclass the US in the regional. Therefore, it has led the US to craft strategies aimed at challenging and obstructing the increasing Chinese engagement with the region. Thus, it has instigated a kind of competition and low-intensity rivalry between the US and China in the region. Such a cut-throat competition would create marvelous opportunities and mounting issues for the regional countries. The article analysis China's economic and defence relations with all the Central Asian countries. It also discusses the escalating Chinese interests and the region's importance for China. In the end, the paper throws light on the impending competition and rivalry between China and the US in the region.

Keywords: China, Central Asia, Energy Resources, Terrorism, US, Rivalry, Opportunities, Challenges.

INTRODUCTION

Since their freedom, because of their unique geopolitical position and different issues amid the change period, Central Asian countries had been a casualty of becoming universal terrorism, religious radicalism and national separatism, and in addition arms dealing, drug trafficking and smuggling, which likewise postured genuine dangers to the encompassing countries, including China (Nicho, Jim, 2009:50-51). China's aims in Central Asian region incorporate guaranteeing outskirts security, entrance to natural resources, and non-bellucose neighbors, and trade. China had

extended its foot shaped impression in Central Asian region through energy contracts, trade, transport foundation, and the progressive augmentation of the extent of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to incorporate both financial and security aspects.

After the freedom of the Central Asian countries, China's impact over the district had stayed exceptionally solid. China had the same borders of more than 3,000 kilometers with Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, and was near to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. After the determination of outskirt debate, the basic quest for outskirt security continues assembly Central Asian states and China together (Huasheng, Zhao, 2006:19). China was a basic accomplice in outskirt security, and an underwriter of territorial protection. The outskirts' security in the middle of three Central Asian countries and China relies on upon their collaboration only, wherever not any additional nation could supplant the position of China. It hoped to see the long-haul peace and security, as opposed to political turbulence, in Central Asia. The associations were among the minority populations in north-west China and Central Asian nations in ethnic gatherings, custom, history, religion, and culture. The rich legacy of lengthy verifiable associations in this area, however disguised during the last one and a half hundreds of years, had continued its impact in China-Central Asia relationships.

CENTRAL ASIA: A REGION OF STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO CHINA

China's primary traders of oil from the Middle East and Africa were diplomatically temperamental, and its supply course through the Malacca Straits was additionally tricky. To address this matter, China perceived that it must discover routes of land based to acquire its natural assets, routes that must be created through Russia and Central Asia. Central Asian region was starting designate realized as the new storage facility of natural assets for the 21st century. This region was invested with a colossal measure of natural assets and was placed in the inside of Eurasia. China's hunger for natural gas and oil had empowered the Chinese to put intensely in the businesses of Central Asia. The regional states could be a course of solidness, as their natural assets could fulfill a percentage of the energy requests of the China. Central Asian states were rich in natural resources, accordingly, it boded well for the Chinese to develop their financial muscle to that a piece of the world (Masoud, Fahim, 2014).

CHINESE INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA

Chinese interests in the Central Asian region had augmented from strength at the outskirts to include terrorists, and fighting radicals,

geopolitics, and energy security, also forces of separatist (Marketos, Thrassy N., 2009:29). Confrontation of the great powers in Central Asia is not desirable for China. It makes the region, directly close to China, a source of strategic intension. Such competition could destabilize the region, which is contrary to Chinese interests.

China had two major, energy-based economic and security interests in region. China's chief security concern was Xinjiang, where Uyghur separatists had posed a serious threat to domestic stability (Xichao, Yu. 2014:3-4). Any instability in the region contains risk of chaos and harms the interests of China in Central Asian region. Energy was a principal interest of China and other countries vying for influence in Central Asia. China's goal was to participate in the expansion of Central Asian region energy through normal competition and to cooperate with other countries (Zhao, Huasheng, Zhao, 2007:160). Chinese investment was guaranteeing access to the regional natural assets and making stable trade relations. This remained particularly essential in light of Beijing's continuous system to raise the level of economic advancement in its western regions and its craving to tight the inland-beachfront thriving crevice (Finkelstein, David:14).

RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND KYRGYZSTAN

Kyrgyzstan had dependably been of incredible vital strategic for China, because of its geographic location. This little Central Asian nation was essential to China as far as customary security, as a key passage point to Xinjiang. It had been a source of Islamic radicalism and Uyghur sympathizers that have had cross border effects of China's domestic security (Eisenman, Joshua, *et.al.*, 2007:76-77). The three malice forces remained the significant risk to security for the two states and the entire area; they firmly censured and contradicted all manifestations of terrorism, separatism, and radicalism, particularly in relationship toward the pro-independence activities in southern Xinjiang. Kyrgyzstan was likewise imperative to China in its endeavors to enhance energy deliveries to guarantee energy protection. Although it had itself just restricted oil saves, it was vital to China as a port of entrance for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan's oil.

China and Kyrgyzstan had established diplomatic relations on January 5, 1992 at the ambassadorial level. In recent years, Sino-Kyrgyz relations had developed smoothly and completely resolved border issues left over by history. China and Kyrgyzstan to support each other in the political sphere, establishing mutually beneficial cooperation in the economic field, learn from each other in a positive and culturally closely

interact, security (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kyrgyz). The China and the Kyrgyzstan marked on 24 June 2002, on the Agreement of Good neighborliness, Relationship and Collaboration amid as having notable and quick centrality as it plans the course for long haul, unfaltering and solid development of their reciprocal relations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China, 2007). The Strategies for Collaboration amid the China and the Kyrgyzstan for 2004-2014 marked on 21 September, 2004, and on 4 August, 2006 (Ibid), and Kyrgyz President approved the Law on the Ratification of the Program of Cooperation, which planed external two-sided participation in particular territories was a managing report for down to business collaboration between the two sides.

They marked two Conventions in 1996 and 1999, to resolve their border debate, 95,000 hectares of land. Both treaties served to standardize and create agreeable relationships in the middle of Bishkek and Beijing. These understandings were confirmed by the Parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic on 7 May, 2002 (Dwivedi, Ramakant, 2006:147). They signed several agreements, in August 2007, 2010 and December 2012, that focused on combating terrorism, military cooperation, economic cooperation, trade promotion and technology preferential export buyer's credit and geology collaboration (Shira, Dezan & Associates, 2012:29). The relations between the two countries had however, been strained from time to time due to several factors, the most important of which was the ethnic unrest in Kyrgyzstan.

Kyrgyzstan was china's main gateway for the Central Asian region, and so signified an idea of specific vulnerability for the China. Kyrgyzstan remains a source of extremism, supporters of Uyghur, and possibly most worrisome over the long haul, the existence of the U.S. military close to the border. These concerns came to a head following the Tulip Revolution in May 2005, when President Akaev was deposed and replaced with a democratic government (Oresman, Mattew, 2005:5-7). Beijing had focused much strategic attention on Kyrgyzstan to ensure the country did not fall outside its influence. China and Kyrgyzstan had also arranged combined anti-terrorism exercises respectively on October 2002 and August 2013 (Ministry of National Defense, People's Republic of China, 2013), near the border of Kyrgyz-Chinese border comprising the security forces of the two states.

China's major trade routes for Chinese goods to other Central Asian states went through Kyrgyzstan and eventually Europe and therefore were a main beneficiary of Chinese infrastructure investment, with new road

and rail links. Kyrgyzstan saw China as a source of foreign aid and an energetic engine of economic development. By the mid 1990s China was the country's largest trading partner after Russia and was more willing than most states to exchange goods. The first-three quarters of 2012, total trade between China and Kyrgyzstan got \$874 million, a year by year rise of 28.6 percent. Kyrgyzstan's major cash cow was gold, with 40% of industrial output and 60% of exports coming from gold mining. The country also had reserves of Uranium, coal, antimony, and gold, and further infrequent earth metals (Shira, Dezan & Associates, 2012:29) and there were insufficient natural gas and oil assets in the Kyrgyzstan.

RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND KAZAKHSTAN

Chinese relations with Kazakhstan could be especially prominent, given its special geographic condition, natural resources, and economic potential. Physically, China shared a more than 1700 km border (half of entire Chinese-CA border) with Kazakhstan through Xinjiang, its western sphere. That made Kazakhstan particularly important in terms of border security and anti-terrorism. Thus, China clearly needed Kazakhstan to cooperate in its endeavor to combat the East Turkestan forces. In addition, Xinjiang had more than 1.3 million Kazakh residents, most of who reside in areas bordering on Kazakhstan (Zhao, Huasheng, 2006:170). Kazakhstan was the China's major shareholder for trade in the region of Central Asia and it was the significant regional partner for energy sector. It had exported oil to China that would touch 4 million tons in the upcoming years, which would significantly fortify interests of Beijing in Kazakhstan (Hawkins, Charles and Love, Robert, 2006:27).

In January, 1992, the China established diplomatic relations with the Kazakhstan (Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in Beijing). China and Kazakhstan have not only laid a solid foundation for bilateral relations but had similarly cooperated to expand a high-level strategic, economic, and political framework. On 8th February, 1995, the China issued a statement to provide a security guarantee to Kazakhstan (Allison, Roy and Jonson, Lena, 2001:155). They reached a final agreement resolving remaining border disputes on 10th May, 2002, on a Treaty on the Delineation of the State Line in Beijing, dividing and demarcating the 1740 km lengthy border among the China and Kazakhstan. Afterward, it was endorsed by the assembly of Kazakh (Gill, Bates, 2007:224).

In 2002, they signed a series of agreements; an agreement on preventing dangerous military activities; a treaty on collaboration against terrorism, separatism, and extremism; the Good Neighbor Treaty of

friendship and collaboration (Zhao, Huasheng, 2006:172). In June 2003, on the event of Hu Jintao's visit to Kazakhstan a project of the collaboration between the two nations was embraced for the period 2003 and 2008 (Peyrouse, Sébastien, 2008:35). In 2004 they agreed to create the China-Kazakhstan Cooperation Commission, with the vice-premier of each country serving as the co-chairs. In the fields of energy, communications, trade, culture, and education, the two countries have adopted intergovernmental development plans, which have become the main mechanism to continuously promote bilateral relations in a systematic way (China-Kazakhstan relations, 2007:6). They agreed on creating and emerging strategic partnership between two states to encourage prosperity, stability, peace, and to expand humanistic and economic collaboration.

Kazakhstan is energy rich state in the region. Its demonstrated oil stores were evaluated at 30 billion barrels and demonstrated natural gas assets at 85 trillion cubic feet (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2013:1-5). The two countries had cooperated on energy for many years; the oil pipelines are a prime example of their cooperation. In the future, Kazakhstan would become one of China's most important sources of energy. China had been chipping away at numerous foundation ventures in Kazakhstan; railroads, roads, bridges, pipelines and airports.

The energy cooperation between China and Kazakhstan began in the 1990. Kazakhstan allowed China's National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) creation privileges to create key fields of oil, with the Aktyubinsk area of northwestern Kazakhstan. The treaty additionally incorporates a goal-oriented arrangement for a 3,000-km pipeline to China's Xinjiang self-ruling province. In August 2005, CNPC bought the Canadian-based organization Petro-Kazakhstan, against \$4.18 billion, the biggest abroad takeover exchange ever constructed by a Chinese corporation (Jing, Du, 2005). They conceded in 2008, for together creating gas and oil holds on the mainland rack of the Caspian Maritime, though China's Guangdong Nuclear Power Company, furthermore Kazakhstan's government atomic company Kazatomprom concurred on improving uranium yield in their dual wander (Bhadrakumar, M.K., 2009:1-5). In 2011, aggregate trade in the middle of China and Kazakhstan added up to 20 billion dollars, checked China turning into Kazakhstan's fundamental trading accomplice (McDermott, Roger, 2011).

China was the biggest shopper of Kazakh merchandise and was second just to Russia as far as Kazakhstan's import market. Given that hydrocarbons represent almost 60 percent of Kazakhstan's exports,

pipeline legislative issues were a key piece of Kazakh-Chinese relationships (Borgeas, Andreas, 2013). The 1,240 km Kazakh-China Oil Pipeline started pushing 200,000 barrels of oil daily from Atasu in northern Kazakhstan to Alashankou in China's northwestern Xinjiang section in July 2006 (U.S. Energy Information Administration, China Oil). In 2008, they consented to a system treaty on building a gas pipeline from Beyneu, north of the Aral Sea, eastward to Shymkent, wherever it would interface through the Central Asia-China gas channel. The pipeline was arranged at first to pump 176.6 bcf to southern Kazakhstan and 176.6 bcf to China. Pipeline development started in September 2011, and to be finished by 2015 (Nichol, Jim, 2014:50-51.).

RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND UZBEKISTAN

Uzbekistan is a large state; it accounts for half of the total population in the region and lies at the center of the region and borders all the additional Central Asian nations. China recognized the importance and sought to develop virtuous relationships with Uzbekistan. Yet unlike, China and Uzbekistan's common interests focused on regional security, politics, and anti-terrorism (Huasheng, Zhao, 2006:26-28). They did not share common border that reduced the opportunity for direct contact, transportation links, border trade, and nongovernmental interaction. Moreover, Uzbekistan griped large hydrocarbon assets, mostly natural gas, however, faced numerous challenges in transporting those assets to global markets.

On 27th December, 1991, China accepted the freedom of the Uzbekistan and after few days it established full diplomatic relations with Uzbekistan on 2nd January, 1992 (Rumer, Boris, 2003:178). Islam Karimov, President of Uzbekistan visited to Beijing in March 1992, where he signed fourteen bilateral agreements (Huwaidin, Mohamed Bin, 2002:80), including umbrella agreements to facilitate scientific and technical cooperation, as well as to provide credits to Uzbekistan to import Chinese goods.

China had marked agreements of friendship and collaboration with several countries of this region, more reinforcing the lawful establishment for the advancement of their relationships. Uzbekistan's association transformed altogether with China, when President of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov visited to China on 25-27 May, 2005. Karimov made his first outing abroad after the Andijan slaughter to Beijing (Eisenman, Joshua *et.al.*, 2007:78). This was a notable gathering in which China transparently backed Uzbekistan's treatment of its 13th May 2005, Andijan riots. Hu Jintao showed that he regarded the way picked by the Uzbek

individuals in accordance with its national condition and their endeavors to protect national freedom, sway and regional trustworthiness (Peterson, Michael A., 2005:87-28). The two nations marked an arrangement on friendly and cooperative partnership. It's centered on advancing participation in the fields of gas, oil, telecommunications, transportation, mining and infrastructure development. Amid President of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov's state visited to China in June 2012, the two nations marked a Statement on Strategic Corporation, in this manner raising their relations (Tolipov, Farkhod, 2013:3-6). On the other hand, China's becoming financial and security vicinity in Central Asia may hoist the relationship to a more elevated amount in advancing years.

China and Uzbekistan promised to further help two-sided participation and extend their key corporation. The Leaders of two nations, marked treaties worth US \$15 billion in key areas, including the exploitation of gas, oil and uranium fields and both nations concurred on augmenting the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan pipeline to the South Yolotan stores in Turkmenistan. They likewise reaffirmed to stay far from any coalition, movement or bargain that damages the other's sovereignty, security and regional honesty (Xi Jinping signs deals, 2013). The two pioneers consented to develop their law enforcement and protection collaboration, battle three evil forces of terrorism, fanaticism and separatism, transnational criminal acts and drug-trafficking, secure real participation ventures, and keep up the peace and soundness of both nations and the entire areas. In the statement, they will increase bilateral trade in coming years and now china was biggest investor in Uzbekistan.

Both countries' state oil firms, the CNPC and Uzbekneftegaz were working closely on gas and oil participation and also investigate and create forthcoming petroleum stores in 5 coastal pieces of the Aral Marine, collected with Russia's Lukoil, Malaysia's Petronas, and South Korea's State Oil Firm. Uzbekistan consented to a treaty with China, to fare up to 10 bcm gas per-year. A limb route of the Turkmen-China trunk channel passed to the town of Gazli, in the Bukhara zone, where the Uzbek gas could be sustained into it. China had put resources into the Uzbek gas fields in the zone. The Uzbek stores were fundamentally packed in the Qashqadaryo territory and close Bukhara nearby which the Chinese pipeline passed (Bhadrakumar, M.K., 2009:1-5). China has become the second biggest trading partner of Uzbekistan. At present, there were more than 488 Chinese corporations enrolled in Uzbekistan, working in an expansive scope of parts including energy, telecom, assets, textile, power, trade, agriculture, and development contracting, they had

made real commitment to Uzbekistan's economy. Consequently, the financial relationship in the middle of Uzbekistan and China was topsy-turvy (Tolipov, Farkhod, 2013:3-6).

RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND TAJIKISTAN

China's association with Tajikistan was made in 1992 and this relationship was strained because of a civil war emitting not long after Tajikistan announced its freedom. The two nations shared a 434 kilometer outskirt in their remote mountain border regions (Peterson, Michael A, 2005:35). From 1997 to 2002, relationship amid the two created steadily inside the edge work of Shanghai Five and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). They incorporated a couple of little private ventures, and aid that China gave to fortify the Tajik military (Olimov, Muzaffar and Olimov, Saodat, 2010:11-12). China had a clear interest in Tajikistan's energy sector and developing cooperation with Tajikistan, as it had with Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, which border the Chinese province of Xinjiang. It dreaded from the Uighurs' extremism, separatism, and terrorism, a Turkic speaking Muslim populace group in this autonomous area. The problems of Tajikistan with protecting its border with Afghanistan were an issue of direct concern to China.

Diplomatic relationships amid the both friendly and neighboring countries were established on 4th January, 1992. The People's Republic of China's Embassy in Dushanbe had been functioning since March 13, 1992 and the Embassy of the Republic of Tajikistan in Beijing was established in April 7, 1997 (The Ministry of foreign affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan). The two countries accounted more than 200 interstate and intergovernmental agreements (Ibid). The Joint Statement on the elementary ethics and key priorities of the bilateral relationships between Tajikistan and China signed March 9, 1993, which laid firmly solid legal foundation for long-term stable development of bilateral relations.

On 15th January 2007, the Presidents of China and Tajikistan marked the agreement on good neighborly friendship and collaboration, consenting to thrust two-sided relationships to larger amounts in Beijing (Olimov, Muzaffar & Olimov, Saodat, 2010:11-12). The primary component of the agreement was consolidated improvement focused around the guideline of shared admiration and common help in reciprocal territories in the fields of, military, political, business, financial, educational and cultural. A border dispute between Tajikistan and China in the Pamir was mainly resolved by an agreement in 1999, and 2002 (Jonson, Lena, 2006:85-88). In the treaty, China surrendered 28,000

square kilometers to Tajikistan, however Tajikistan surrendered 1,000 square kilometers the range of Pamir Mountain toward China.

They made a strategic partnership on 20th May, 2013. The two nations ought to additionally successfully utilize collaboration to support financial development and increase coordination on noteworthy universal and local issues and help one another's endeavors to protect national sovereignty, security and regional respectability. Both sides would together investigate mineral, gas and oil assets and examine collaboration in solar energy, and wind power infrastructure. They also consented to start the development of Line-D, a Turkmenistan-Tajikistan-China gas pipeline crossing Tajikistan for 400 km (Boulègue, Mathieu, 2013:3).

China had been Tajikistan's third-biggest trading accomplice for quite a long time, with respective trade volume outstanding \$2 billion in 2012, 15 times that of 10 years back (Zhendong, Pu, 2013). China had likewise put an extraordinary arrangement in Tajikistan's vitality advancement and its framework, including development of the state's national force transmission grids and numerous main highways Chinese corporations were busy in Tajikistan's hydropower ventures.

RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND TURKMENISTAN

Since freedom, China's impact in Turkmenistan had been negligible in view of Turkmenistan's worldwide stance of positive impartiality. This lack of bias has restricted Turkmenistan's association respectively with China and clarifies its prohibition from multilateral gatherings, for example, the SCO. Nevertheless, China did have normal, friendly relations with Ashgabat. Turkmenistan had rich reserves of natural gas in world's rank fifth; hence China sought to develop good relations with Turkmenistan, especially regarding trade and energy (Rumer, Eugene, *et.al.*, 2007:178-179). Turkmenistan did not share a border with China, and was even farther from Chinese territory. It appeared Beijing to avoid engagement with Ashgabat at least in the near term unless the regional security situation or China's energy needs demand it. After the independence, China was amongst the first state to accept the sovereignty of new five countries and only a week later, it established full diplomatic relations with Turkmenistan on 6th January (Rumer, Boris, 2003:178). On trade and economic collaboration, two-way exchange surpassed 10 billion US dollars in 2012. China had turned into the biggest trade accomplice of Turkmenistan and the two nations were each-other's supportive ally in natural gas (China-Turkmenistan ties, 2013).

The Two heads of state met on 3rd September, 2013, in Ashkhabad and chose to lift reciprocal binds to a vital association (Chinese,

Turkmenistan presidents, 2013). Amid their gathering, the two nations had delighted in high political shared trust and ought to immovably help one another's endeavors in defending national sovereignty and security, and regional respectability, and in advancing social and monetary improvement. China and Turkmenistan as key accomplices in the genuine sense; China would dependably be Turkmenistan's great companion, great accomplice and great sibling.

The energy relationship in the middle of China and Turkmenistan began with consenting to a treaty on pipeline development venture for a long-haul gas supply bargain on 3rd April, 2006 (Elik, Suleyman, 2012:150). Object two of the treaty expresses; The Chinese Firm would buy 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas each year from Turkmenistan at the Turkmenistan outskirts more than thirty years, beginning from the date the Turkmenistan-China gas channel was charged in 2009. In July 2007, meeting between Chinese and Turkmen presidents saw the marking of a gas deals and buy treaty amid two for the supply of 1.1 tcf gas each year (Nichol, Jim, 2009:52). Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline, around 7,000 km altogether distance, would bypass the domain of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. As per authority bases, 188 km would experience Turkmenistan's domain, 530 km over Uzbekistan, 1,300 km through Kazakhstan and more than 4,500 over China's region. It joined the Bagtyarlyk, Samman-Depe and Altyn Asyr gas fields in Turkmenistan to Alashankou in China's Xinjinag area, wherever the pipeline interfaces with China's incompletely finished Second West-East Gas Pipeline (Elik, Suleyman, 2012:150-153). This arrangement broke Gazprom's syndication and provoked Russia to finish up its own gas contract with Turkmenistan. It likewise started the route for the China National Petroleum Corporation to go into a creation imparting consent to create the Turkmen gas fields sustaining the pipeline. This task was a huge step towards guaranteeing China's vitality security.

CHINA AND U.S. RIVALRY IN CENTRAL ASIA

The vital location of this area was progressively imperative after the crumbling of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, stimulating the constant anxiety of different worldwide and local forces. China and the United States amid others, impart numerous normal investments and clashes in this locale, which renders their association a mixture of collaboration and rivalry. China's part in Central Asia really supplements American strategy objectives for this area. China was a strength against Islamic radicalism and backs the foundation of steady, secular regional governments.

After the 9/11 attacks, the United States consented to arrangements with Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan individually on the utilization of particular of their airplane terminals; it additionally chose to set a long haul rent on the utilization of the Kyrgyzstan's Manas Airport and the Uzbekistan's Hanabad Airport (Oliker, Olga and Shlapak, David A., 2005:11-19). American interests in Central Asia, i.e. averting the spread of terrorism, political and economic change, and guaranteeing the protected and straightforward exploitation of Caspian assets (Jones, A. Elizabeth, 2001:5-10). US intended to murder three birds with one stone, such as to apply impact on south Russia, energy transportation ways, and Xinjiang of China (Zhuangzhi, Sun, 2006:36).

China's worry over disorder in this area has uplifted in March 2005, when the Tulip Revolution happened in Kyrgyzstan and President Akayev was removed from authority. China accepted that the U.S. might have been some way or another behind the move and looked to place an administration that was friendlier toward the America (Peterson, Michael A., 2005:31). In May of that year, China underpinned the Uzbek government, when it savagely took action against dissenters in Andijan, an occasion that impelled a dropping out between the Uzbek government and that of the U.S. (Cooley, Alexander, 2012:38-40). From China's viewpoint, Tashkent's activities in Andijan were significant in avoiding further turmoil and viciousness, and remote requires an examination were seen as clear impedance in sovereign issues.

The colored revolts had had a bad impact on American influence in this area. These revolutions had precipitated force on the U.S. to shut its army instalations in this region, which had been one of Washington's key gains. Despite assurances, the United States evidently intends to maintain these "temporary" bases for a long time to come. The colored revolutions precipitated new opposition from regional leaders and the July 2005, SCO summit in the blink of an eye from there on, the SCO presidents issued a joint statement calling upon the United States to set a timetable for hauling out all the army installations it had gained in Central Asia after 9/11 (Katz, Mark N, 2008). Shortly afterward, on 29th July, 2005, Uzbekistan officially provided the United States six months to vacate its military instalations from (K-2) Karshi-Khanabad. Although Kyrgyzstan granted to the continued presence of the American base at Manas, it did so only after the U.S. secretary of defence made a personal plea and agreed to pay a higher price (Rumsfeld's Visit, 2005). On 21st November, 2005, the United States closed its military base in Uzbekistan, so the small country of Kyrgyzstan became the sole Central Asian country to

have an American military facility on its soil (Zhao, Huasheng, 2007:194).

The difference between the Chinese and American perspective was not only a matter of understanding, but also of values: whereas China deemed stability most important, the United States made democratization its primary political objective. China held that stability was a precondition for the development of democracy; the United States believed that democracy was a precondition for stability. China regarded stability even under an imperfect regime as better than chaos under a perfect regime; the United States deemed stability under a centralized regime unimportant and installation of a democratic government as a top priority.

CONCLUSION

The Central Asia bestows China with marvellous opportunities and daunting Challenges. Despite increasing issues, China has traversed a slew of obstructive paths while cultivating effectual economic and defence ties. The energy-rich Central Asian states are of paramount importance for China to fulfill its ever-rising energy needs. The Communist state has maintained very close economic and defence relations with all the regional states. The region has afforded China with a range of opportunities to considerably expedite its economic boom and military rise. After having considered Chinese rise in the region, the US has crafted some counter-China strategies to contain Chinese rise in the region. As a result, the confrontational mood of bilateral relations has instigated a sort of low-intensity rivalry between both the countries. If they continue with such conflicting behaviour, the simmering competition would end up with more estrangement in the foreseeable future.

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